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DUE PROCESS: Tom v. Sutton- RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR AN INDIGENT
INDIAN IN A TRIBAL COURT CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING
Noma D. Gurich
For nearly two hundred years, the United States Constitution has
been the mainstay of individual rights and liberties for the majori-
ty of the citizens of this country. Yet, Indians living on on reserva-
tions throughout the nation have not always been afforded such
protection.' This dual standard was allowed to exist in theUnited
States because courts were reluctant to find tribal power restricted
by the Constitution.2 This reluctance developed as early as 1832,
when the United States Supreme Court characterized Indian tribes
as being "distinct, independent political communities,"3 and as
such, qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by vir-
tue of any delegation of powers from the federal government, but
by reason of inherent tribal sovereignty. Then, in the early 1960's,
spurred by Senator Sam Ervin, Congress began to question
whether such immunity from constitutional restraint had resulted
in actual deprivations of constitutional rights of Indians by Indian
tribes.' In an effort to afford federal protection to Indians in their
internal tribal lives, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 (ICRA). The Act made most of the language of the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution applicable to Indian
tribes, including the right to have the assistance of counsel.6 This
note will discuss to what extent the right to appointed counsel has
been and should be extended to Indians in criminal proceedings in
tribal courts.
Constitutional Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
This phrase has been construed by the Supreme Court to mean
that the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty is withheld from federal and state courts in all criminal pro-
ceedings unless the accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived
the assistance of counsel.! The right to counsel is also protected by
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
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If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted
that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and,
therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense .... But
passing that, and assuming their inability, even if opportuni-
ty has been given, to employ counsel, as the trial court
evidently did assume, we are of the opinion that, under the
circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so
vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of
due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8
The right to counsel has been divided into two distinct areas,
the right to retained counsel and the right to appointed counsel.
The right to retained counsel has never been disputed, 9 while the
latter was achieved only after many years of litigation. It is now
well settled that a defendant in a federal or state criminal prosecu-
tion is entitled to appointment of counsel if he cannot afford one,
whether the offense with which he is charged is classified as petty,
misdemeanor, felony, or capital."0
Right to Retained Counsel in
a Criminal Proceeding in Tribal Court
There are many cases supporting the conclusion that prior to
the ICRA, the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution was
not applicable to Indians living on reservations." The leading case
in this area is Talton v. Mayes,"2 wherein the Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment right to indictment by a Grand Jury was
not applicable to acts of tribal government. In view of this body of
case law, it is not surprising that a United States District Court sit-
ting in Montana concluded that the federal constitutional
guarantee of the right to counsel does not apply to prosecutions in
tribal courts."3 The federal court considered the petitioner's argu-
ment that he was denied his constitutional rights in the tribal court
by reason of the failure to make counsel available to him, and con-
cluded:
The right to be represented by counsel is protected by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. These Amendments,
however, protect this right only as against action by the
United States in the case of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
and as against action by the states in the case of the Four-
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teenth Amendment. Indian tribes are not states within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
This holding was reaffirmed some years later in the case of
Settler v. Lameer."5 In that case, the court considered the constitu-
tional challenge of an Indian who had been convicted of several
misdemeanors in the tribal court in 1967. Although by the time
this decision was handed down, the ICRA was in effect, the court
refused to apply it retroactively and stated: "Here the proceedings
in Tribal Court occurred prior to the enactment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968. Accordingly we find no merit in the conten-
tion that the Tribal Court deprived petitioner of his constitutional
rights by denying him representation by professional counsel."16
The right to the assistance of counsel was first extended to In-
dians living under the authority of tribal court 7 by the ICRA. 18
The right to be represented by retained counsel is set forth in clear
language: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-govern-
ment shall.., deny to any person in a criminal proceeding... at
his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense."19 Prior to the ICRA, many tribes prohibited the appear-
ance of lawyers, particularly non-Indians, in tribal courts.' Such
prohibitions are now of questionable validity, and would not sur-
vive a challenge if an accused were inclined to do so. The trend ap-
pears to be that the appearance of professional counsel in tribal
courts has increased since the passage of the ICRA.2'
Denial of the Right to Appointed Counsel in a
Tribal Court Criminal Proceeding
The limited right to counsel provided by Section 1302(6) of the
ICRA is concurrent with the constitutional right of retained
counsel in federal and state proceedings.' The inclusion of this
statutory right has led several commentators to question whether
this provision should be construed to include the constitutional re-
quirements of appointed counsel as a wealthy defendant is now
accorded a special advantage in tribal court. Section 1302(8) of the
ICRA gives further support to the argument in favor of extending
the right to counsel because of the inclusion of the guarantees of
equal protection and due process: "No Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person
of liberty or property without due process of law."' Those provi-
sions in the Constitution have been construed to include the right
to appointed counsel.' The issue of the right to appointed counsel
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in tribal court has been raised in two recent cases. Cliff v.
Hawley' involved an indigent Indian who was charged with
assault and battery in Tribal Court on the Fort Belknap Reserva-
tion in Montana. Defendent Cliff filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and for appointment of an attorney in the federal
district court. Three grounds for the appointment of counsel were
alleged: (1) the Indian Civil Rights Act," (2) Argersinger v.
Hamlin,27 and (3) Section 3006A of Title 18 of the United States
Code." The federal district court issued the following order:
Petitioner has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is
clear that the petitioner, an indigent defendant, is entitled to
the assistance of counsel. (Citations omitted.) But this Court,
which has limited authority to furnish representation does
not have the authority to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendent before a Tribal Court. (Citation omitted.)
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Judge of the Tribal
Court must appoint counsel.29
This order was later stayed pending the outcome of the Ninth Cir-
cuit case involving the same issue."
On March 10, 1976, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
an opinion in the case of Tom v. Sutton.3' This case was an appeal
from an order of a federal district court in Washington dismissing
defendent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant Tom,
an enrolled member of the Lummi Tribe, had pled guilty to driv-
ing a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license within the
boundaries of the Lummi Reservation and was sentenced to serve
10 days in jail. The sole issue raised by appellant was whether he
had the right to the assistance of appointed counsel in the criminal
proceedings before Tribal Court. The lower court denied ap-
pellant the right to appointed counsel.
On appeal, appellant contended that he had a right to appointed
counsel for two reasons: (1) The due process language of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act necessarily required the tribal courts to ap-
point professional defense counsel for indigent criminal defen-
dants appearing before the Lummi Tribal Court, 2 and (2) irrespec-
tive of the Indian Bill of Rights enacted by Congress, Article VIII
of the Lummi Tribal Constitution guarantees him the right to ap-
pointed counsel.3
The court of appeals dismissed appellant's first argument by
relying upon a rule of construction which states that an enactment
is to be construed so as to give it the effect that Congress
intended. ' The court then related some of the legislative history
surrounding the composition of the ICRA, including the fact that
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representatives of various Indian tribes appeared in opposition to
the adoption of the Federal Constitution in toto.' The court also
stated that as a result of the opposition, the Department of the In-
terior submitted a substitute bill which guaranteed only specific
enumerated rights to the Indians.' The court concluded with the
legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.3 7
In refuting appellant's second proposition, the court of appeals
used three arguments: (1) Because the Lummi constitution was
adopted two years before Argersinger v. Hamlin ' was decided,
the Lummi Tribe could not have intended to provide counsel for
indigents charged with petty offenses; 39 (2) every provision of the
constitution must be interpreted in light of the entire document,
and because the Lummi constitution adopted the civil rights of
citizens off the reservation as well as the ICRA, the general
language of the former must be limited by the specific language of
the ICRA regarding the right to counsel;' ° and (3) federal courts
should accept the interpretation of state courts in giving effect to a
state constitution unless a federal constitutional question is in-
volved. In the same manner, deference should be given to the in-
terpretation of the Lummi constitution by the Lummi Tribal
Court, which permitted a person to have counsel only at his own
expense." Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision and denied appellant the right to appointed
counsel.
Toward the Right to Appointed Counsel in a
Tribal Court Criminal Proceeding
A federal district court sitting in Montana and one sitting in
Washington considered the same issue-the right to appointed
counsel in a criminal proceeding in tribal court for an Indian who
could not afford counsel-at about the same time, using similar
resources, and arrived at opposite conclusions. The reason for the
different outcomes is based on the fact that the individuals involv-
ed in the drafting of the ICRA were motivated by different con-
siderations, which in turn created some ambiguity in the ICRA,
leaving room for considerable litigation. As the Supreme Court
has not yet considered the issue of appointed counsel on Indian
reservations, the litigation will undoubtedly continue."
Because of the ambiguity in the ICRA, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals exaggerated the importance of the "legislative intent"
in construing the due process clause of it. While some commen-
tators portray the ICRA as being an attempt at maintaining Indian
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sovereignty, ' others describe the Act as a compromise among in-
terest groups." One author suggested that it was clear "that Con-
gress viewed extension of the Bill of Rights to Indian reservations
as a tool for strengthening tribal institutions and organizations,
not as a weapon for their destruction," while another described
the goal of Senator Ervin (the moving force behind the ICRA) as
trying to "duplicate the North Carolina assimilation experience on
a national level. 4 6 In light of these apparent contradictions, it is
difficult to conclude absolutely that due process means something
different for Indians on reservations.'7 If the intent of Congress
were to assimilate tribal courts into the federal system, then a dif-
ferent standard would not accomplish the goal." If the ICRA were
merely a compromise among special interests, then the standard
which is best suited to the Indians on reservations may not even
have been considered.'9 Congress was certainly aware of the state
of the constitutional law regarding the right to appointed counsel
in 1968. Because the Supreme Court had not included petty crimes
and misdemeanors within the requirement for appointed counsel,
Congress had no reason to extend appointed counsel to Indians in
Tribal Court because of the limited jurisdiction of those courts. °
Congress could not have known that the constitutional require-
ment for appointed counsel would change four years later;
therefore, without language indicating otherwise, it is erroneous
to assume that Congress did not intend the ICRA to be adapted to
changing interpretations of constitutional standards.
The Ninth Circuit also gave considerable weight to the fact that
representatives of various Indian tribes appeared in opposition to
the adoption of the entire Federal Constitution. However, a close
look at the proceedings reveals that of approximately 250 tribes,
only about 36 tribes participated in the hearings. 1 The court also
indicated that the revisions by the Department of the Interior were
due to opposition from the tribes. Another view indicates that:
Throughout the debate sparked by Senator Ervin's pro-
posals, the attitude of the Department of the Interior and the
BIA remained consistent. When vital organizational in-
terests, such as reputation and control, were not involved,
and when a commitment of resources was not required, they
proved to be cooperative. But when confronted with the
limitation of their responsibilities or influence or when
pressed for a commitment to additional tasks, they resisted,
even if the interests of the Indian people were compromised. 2
Finally, the court relied on the specific language of Section
1302(6) to exclude the right to appointed counsel. As discussed
386
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previously, 3 the right to appointed counsel and the right to re-
tained counsel are distinct, yet are both protected in the same con-
stitutional language, even though not specifically spelled out. If
the term "due process" has a constant meaning, then the right to
appointed counsel should receive the same protection in the ICRA
as it does in the Federal Constitution.
Turning to the discussion of appellant's second contention in-
volving the Lummi Tribal Constitution, the court of appeals ig-
nored the consequences of the Argersinger v. Hamlin opinion' on
the right to appointed counsel for Indians. The court stated that
the Lummi Tribe did not intend to include appointment of counsel
in their constitution when it was adopted in 1970 because the con-
trolling constitutional opinion at that time" only required the ap-
pointment of counsel in serious crimes. This argument takes into
account the fact that Congress had removed most felonies from
the jurisdiction of Tribal Courts' and had limited the punishment
that could be imposed by tribal courts to a maximum of six
months imprisonment, or a fine of $500, or both. 7 This argument
overlooks the fact that the Tribal Court's jurisdiction was not
limited only to misdemeanors. Conceivably, one could commit a
felony other than those specifically excluded from the Tribal
Court's jurisdiction, and receive a penalty no more serious than
six months in jail and/or a $500 fine.' Thus, the Lummi constitu-
tion, by incorporating the rights enjoyed by non-Indians under the
Federal Constitution, did not exclude the possibility of the ap-
pointment of counsel in felony cases. The Lummi constitution did
not include language limiting its tribesmen to constitutional rights
for non-Indians existing in 1970, and exclude any rights which
might be acquired later. Therefore, when the constitutional re-
quirement for appointed counsel changed in 1972, the Lummi con-
stitution, which included the right to appointed counsel in felony
cases, was extended to include misdemeanors.
The second argument offered by the court of appeals to
disprove the right to appointed counsel in the Lummi Tribal Con-
stitution involved another rule of construction. The court con-
cluded that the specific language of the ICRA takes precedence
over the general language in the Lummi constitution which
guaranteed Indians all rights guaranteed to non-Indians. This rule
of construction is applicable only when there is a conflict in
statutory language that cannot be resolved by merely reading the
statute. 9' In this case, there is no conflicting language. The Federal
Constitution and the ICRA guarantee the right to counsel, and
both use the language "due process." Because there is no language
in the Lummi constitution defining due process, the phrase must
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be considered to have a consistent meaning each time it is used.
Moreover, a statute is always subject to the test of constitutionali-
ty. Because a statute is presumed constitutional, there is no con-
flict in the Lummi constitution, and the court erred in concluding
that the right to appointed counsel in the Federal Constitution is
limited by the ICRA.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
deference should be given the interpretation of the Lummi Tribal
Court. The important qualification in the rule of construction
followed by the court is that deference is given a state court's inter-
pretation unless a federal question is involved. The court com-
pletely overlooked the fact that there was a federal question in-
volved in this case-the right to appointed counsel. Moreover, a
question involving an Indian tribe is in itself a federal question.
Because the federal court had the authority to make the interpreta-
tion, the court's reasoning was clearly defective.
Other criticisms have been made concerning extending the right
to appointed counsel to Indians in tribal court. One major
criticism is the lack of resources of Indian tribes to fund such a
program. The income level of reservation Indians falls well below
the poverty line. Average annual family income of $1,500,' land
held in trust by the BIA, and meager royalties received for white
development of reservation resources provide inadequate bases
for tribal revenue.6' Alternative sources of funding appointed
counsel may come from federal government agencies such as the
BIA, OEO,62 or the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."
Funding from government sources is not out of the question
because the possibility of such funding was discussed during the
hearings preceding the passage of the ICRA.
The Department of the Interior's response to the issue of the
right to defense counsel revealed, however, its insensitive at-
titude that the Indians had testified about in the earlier hear-
ings. The Solicitor recommended that defendants have the
right to counsel but only at their own expense. He claimed
that the alternative was to obtain appropriations from Cong-
ress to pay lawyers appointed by the tribal courts and, in
order to maintain a balance, also to provide prosecutors for
the courts. If the problem was [sic] one of maintaining a
balance, there was no reason to accord the wealthy defen-
dant a special advantage. Rather, it appeared that the BIA
was reluctant to assume the initiative to obtain extra ap-
propriations from Congress, as it had similarly failed to re-
quest adequate funds to maintain tribal libraries and
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facilities. In view of the Bureau's past performance, it is not
surprising that it presented the choice essentially as one
between the right to counsel at the defendant's expense or no
right to counsel at all, instead of being prepared to seek funds
for a balanced, professional Tribal Court system."
The lack of personnel is another criticism aimed at the require-
ment of appointed counsel. Some tribes with the help of legal con-
sultants have set up tribal bar examinations to prepare attorneys
to practice before the Tribal Court.6 On a few reservations,
lawyers from federal legal service programs may be available to
individuals.' With increased federal funding such services could
be expanded. Another way to combat the lack of legal personnel is
to permit lay representatives to represent indigents in Tribal
Court. 7 However, the Department of the Interior has informally
notified tribes that "counsel" means what one would normally
consider it to mean," that is, a duly qualified attorney.
Another criticism is that using professional appointed counsel
will further erode the cultural autonomy of Indians. While this
may be the strongest argument against counsel in general, it has
little impact now that the right to retained counsel has been im-
posed upon the tribal courts by the ICRA. There is no good reason
to accord the wealthy Indian an advantage over his poorer
brother. The effects of a criminal conviction on an individual call
for adequate procedural safeguards for all Indians.6 Furthermore,
tribal courts will become more sophisticated with the increased
presence of attorneys,7" and with increased access for appeal to the
federal system, the need will increase for adequate representation
at the Tribal Court level.
Conclusion
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 extended the right to be
represented by counsel to the Indian in Tribal Court for the first
time. While in 1968 the need for appointed counsel for indigents in
criminal proceedings was not realized, by 1972 the requirement
was absolute. Continuing to deprive indigent reservation Indians
of the right to counsel renders the promise of individual rights pro-
claimed in the ICRA hollow at best. To allow the wealthy man
procedural protections and not to extend those protections to the
poor man places the majority of reservation Indians in a position
worse than before the ICRA was enacted. Although tribe-
provided counsel for indigent criminal defendants will be among
the most onerous of requirements because of its cost, the burden
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must be assumed. The absolute need for professional assistance
led the Supreme Court long ago to conclude: "The right to be
heard would be in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
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